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Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that nancial liberalization can help countries insure against idiosyn-
cratic risk. There is little evidence, however, that countries have increased risk sharing despite recent
widespread nancial liberalization. This work shows that the key to understanding this puzzling ob-
servation is that conventional wisdom assumes frictionless international nancial markets, while actual
international nancial markets are far from frictionless. In particular, nancial contracts are incomplete
and enforceability of debt repayment is limited. Default risk of debt contracts constrains borrowing, and
more importantly, it makes borrowing more dicult in bad times, precisely when countries need insur-
ance the most. Thus, default risk of debt contracts hinders international risk sharing. When countries
remove their ocial capital controls, default risk is still present as an implicit barrier to capital ows;
the observed increase in capital ows under nancial liberalization is in fact too limited to improve risk
sharing. If default risk of debt contracts were eliminated, capital ows would be six times greater, and
international risk sharing would increase substantially.
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Keyword: international risk sharing, nancial integration, nancial liberalization, nancial frictions,
sovereign default, international capital ows
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Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed widespread removal of capital controls in both developed
and developing countries. Consequently, countries have become more nancially integrated over time. In
particular, debt as the major form of international capital ows rises substantially: in a cross section of 43
countries, the ratio of the net debt position and GDP has more than doubled from 8% in 1970{1986 to 18%
in 1987{2004.1 Conventional wisdom predicts that countries can better insure macroeconomic risk when
they are more nancially integrated. Puzzlingly, an extensive empirical literature nds little evidence that
countries increased consumption smoothing and risk sharing despite widespread nancial liberalization.2
This paper argues that the key to understanding this puzzling observation is that conventional wis-
dom assumes frictionless international nancial markets, while actual markets are far from frictionless. In
particular, international nancial contracts are incomplete and have limited enforceability. These frictions
endogenously constrain capital ows across countries, even when countries remove capital controls. Thus,
the observed increase in capital ows under nancial liberalization is too limited to signicantly improve
consumption smoothing and risk sharing.3
We study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a continuum of small open economies
and production. Motivated by empirical observations, we model international nancial markets with two
frictions. One is incomplete contracts which take the form of non-contingent bonds. The other is limited
enforceability of contracts, where countries have the option to default on their debt but lose access to nancial
markets and suer from drops in output for some period if they default. We focus on debt contracts because
debt accounts for the majority of foreign asset positions across countries: over 70% in terms of gross positions
and over 60% in terms of net positions for our 43 countries.4 Recurrent episodes of sovereign default in the
data motivate us to study default risk and to model default as an equilibrium phenomenon.
To proxy a wide class of capital controls in the data, we impose a tax on foreign asset holdings5 and
calibrate the tax to match the observed capital ows in the less-integrated period. We model nancial
liberalization as an exogenous elimination of this tax. In response to nancial liberalization, the model
generates an increase in capital ows of similar magnitude to that found in the data from the less-integrated
to more-integrated period. The model also reproduces main features of sovereign default in the data. Default
tends to occur in bad and volatile times, and defaulting countries have higher debt to output ratios than
non-defaulting countries. Moreover, default occurs more frequently in the more-integrated period.
1The sample consists of 21 developed countries and 22 more-nancially-integrated developing countries, based on Prasad et
al. (2003). For details see Data Appendix 1.
2For a detailed discussion, see Kose et al. (2009).
3Henceforth we use the word \risk sharing" to stand for both risk sharing and consumption smoothing.
4Kraay et al. (2005) also document that roughly three-quarters of net north-south capital ows take the form of net lending.
Equity and FDI ows are rather limited, as reected by the well-established equity home bias puzzle (Tesar and Werner, 1995)
and the fact that equity markets in emerging economies remain relatively underdeveloped.
5See Neely (1999) for a detailed discussion.
1Given its success in producing observed nancial integration and sovereign default, we use this model
to assess the quantitative implications of nancial liberalization on international risk sharing. We measure
the degree of international risk sharing with the coecient on output growth (henceforth risk sharing coe-
cient) in a panel regression of consumption growth rates on output growth rates, as is prevalently used in the
empirical literature. The smaller the risk sharing coecient, the higher the degree of international risk shar-
ing. The model produces limited international risk sharing in both the less-integrated and more-integrated
period: 0.64 and 0.63. More importantly, even though capital ows double across these two periods as in
the data, international risk sharing improves little.
Financial frictions are key to understanding limited risk sharing in both periods. When only non-
contingent bonds are available, countries have limited access to insure against risk. Default risk on these
bonds further restricts risk sharing. Though equilibrium default helps complete markets by making noncon-
tingent repayments somewhat contingent,6 default risk greatly constrains ex-ante borrowing, especially at
bad times when countries need insurance the most. Borrowing is constrained because creditors never oer
debt contracts that will be defaulted upon with certainty and they charge an interest rate premium on debt
that carries a positive default probability. Countries at bad times face a higher interest rate schedule because
with persistent shocks they are more likely to stay at bad times tomorrow and to default tomorrow since
repayment is more costly in terms of welfare at bad times.
Default risk is key to generating little improvement in international risk sharing across the two periods.
When the tax on foreign asset holdings is eliminated, the model generates an increase in the debt-output
ratio from 8% to 18% as observed in the data. The increase, however, is limited by default risk, and so the
model produces little improvement in international risk sharing. If default risk were also eliminated in the
more-integrated period, the debt-output ratio would be 108xx%, six times xx larger than the observed ratio.
Consequently, international risk sharing would improve substantially even with only non-contingent bonds;
the risk sharing coecient would be lowered to 0.4x instead of 0.63.
Consistent with our nding of little improvement in risk sharing, the implied welfare gain from the removal
of capital controls is small; permanent consumption increases by 1.2%. In contrast, if default risk were also
eliminated in the more-integrated period, permanent consumption would increase by xxx% even with only
non-contingent bonds. If, in addition, a full set of assets were also available in the more-integrated period,
permanent consumption would increase by xxx%. Thus, relative to the potential welfare gains, the welfare
gain from the removal of capital controls is small when international nancial markets are characterized by
limited enforceability of debt contracts.
Our model introduces production into the sovereign debt literature, pioneered by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and advanced by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2007), and Yue (2005). Existing works
6For detailed arguments, see Grossman and van Huyck (1988)
2study a pure exchange economy without storage. This model framework is unsatisfactory when used to
evaluate the impact of nancial integration on international risk sharing. The model attributes any observed
consumption smoothing to nancial integration because there is no other means to smooth consumption.
Our production setup, however, allows countries to self-insure with capital even when they are closed.
Moreover, the production framework captures the two important roles of international capital ows: an
ecient allocation of capital and risk sharing in consumption across countries.
This work is related to the international business cycle literature, which studies welfare gains and con-
sumption variability. In a pure exchange setup, van Wincoop (1999) shows that the potential welfare gain
from closed economies to frictionless nancial integration could be large for the OECD countries, about a
2.5% to 7.5% permanent increase in consumption. In a production framework, our work studies welfare
gains for dierent scenarios of nancial integration. We nd that the removal of capital controls leads to
rather limited welfare gains due to nancial frictions. If default risk were also eliminated, the potential
welfare gains would be much higher even with non-contingent bonds. With a small open economy model
and incomplete markets, Mendoza (1994) nds that consumption variability is not sensitive to a calibrated
change in exogenous borrowing constraints. Our work endogenizes borrowing constraints and points out
that default risk is the key to the limited increase in capital ows in response to nancial liberalization.
The organization of the paper is straightforward. Section 2 lays out the theoretical model. We parame-
terize the model, present and analyze the quantitative results in section 3. Section 4 provides further analysis
on the model implications and section 5 concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the theoretical framework designed to model the impact of nancial liberalization
on international risk sharing. The world economy consists of a continuum of small open economies and
a large number of international nancial intermediaries. All economies produce a homogeneous good that
can be either consumed or invested. Financial intermediaries perform the functions of international nancial
markets, pooling savings and loaning funds across countries. Two key frictions exist in international nancial
markets. First, the markets are incomplete; only uncontingent debt claims are traded between nancial
intermediaries and countries. Second, debt contracts have limited enforcement; that is, countries have
the option to default on their debt. We model the default choice explicitly and allow default to arise in
equilibrium.
2.1 Individual Countries
Each country consists of a benevolent government, a continuum of identical consumers and a production
technology. Countries face dierent shocks to their production technologies. The production function is given
3by the standard Cobb-Douglas, aKL1 , where a denotes the country-specic idiosyncratic shock to total
factor productivity (TFP), K the capital input, L the labor input, and  the capital share parameter. The
TFP shock follows a rst-order Markov process with nite support A and transition matrix . Given our
focus on the abilities of countries to share idiosyncratic risk, we abstract from world aggregate uncertainty.
The benevolent government chooses consumption, investment, borrowing (lending), and whether to de-





where C denotes consumption, 0 <  < 1 the discount factor, and u() utility which satises the usual
Inada conditions. Labor supply is inelastic. We normalize each country's allocation by its labor endowment
and let lowercase letters denote variables after normalization. Thus, the production function simplies to
f(k) = ak.
We model centralized borrowing, where the domestic government makes international borrowing, lend-
ing and default decisions for two reasons. Empirically, international loans typically involve the domestic
government (implicitly or explicitly), which motivates the sovereign debt literature to prevalently model
centralized borrowing.7 Also, centralized borrowing provides larger capital ows and higher welfare than de-
centralized borrowing, where individual consumers make decisions on borrowing, lending and default.8 Thus,
by modeling centralized borrowing, we allow more room for international risk sharing.
In each period, a country is either in the normal phase or in the penalty phase. Countries in the normal
phase have access to international nancial markets and remain in this phase if they repay outstanding debt.
Upon default, however, countries are thrown into the penalty phase where they lose their access to nancial
markets, suer from a drop in TFP, but have some probability of returning to the normal phase.
The default penalties are modeled to capture two key empirical features of sovereign default. First,
defaulting countries often regain access to markets after some period of exclusion, as documented by Gelos
et al. (2004). We capture this by allowing countries to return to the market with some exogenous probability
in each period. Second, output falls during sovereign default. Cohen (1992) documents an \unexplained"
productivity slowdown in the 1980s debt crisis. Tomz and Wright (2007) report that output is below trend
about 1.4% during the entire period of renegotiation for a sample of 175 countries during 1820{2004. Potential
channels through which sovereign default causes aggregate output to fall are disruptions to international trade
and to the domestic nancial system. Theoretically these disruptions could lead to a drop in output if foreign
intermediate goods or nancing for working capital are inputs for production. Empirical work, however, has
not fully explored these channels. Agnostic about the channels of costs associated with default, we instead
capture these losses as a drop in total factor productivity.
7Eaton and Fernandez (1995) provide a detailed discussion of the empirical motivation for centralized borrowing.
8As pointed out by Jeske (2006), individual consumers fail to endogenize the impact of their borrowing on aggregate borrowing
terms under decentralized borrowing.
4The timing is as follows. At the beginning of each period, agents observe each country's TFP shock.
Next, countries in the normal phase decide whether to default and also choose their consumption, investment
and bond holdings according to their default decisions. Countries in the penalty phase cannot borrow or
save abroad and so only decide on consumption and investment. Countries in dierent phases face dierent
constraints, and so we examine their problems in turn.
Country in the Normal Phase
The state of each country is summarized by x = (s;h), where h denotes its phase with h = N indicating the
normal phase and h = P indicating the penalty phase; s = (a;k;b) denotes its productivity shock a, capital
stock k and bond holding b. Let X = S  H be the state space with S = A  R+  R and H = fN;Pg.
A country s in the normal phase can choose whether to default on its outstanding debt by comparing
the respective welfares, so its value function V (s;N) is given by
V (s;N) = maxfWR(s);WD(a;k)g (2)
where WR(s) denotes the repayment welfare and WD(a;k) the default welfare. Let d denote the default
decision with d = 0 indicating repaying and d = 1 indicating defaulting. Country s chooses to repay if and
only if WR(s)  WD(a;k).
If it defaults, the country gets its debt written o, but it will be penalized. Today the country suers
a loss in TFP and cannot access international nancial markets. From the next period on the country will
stay in the penalty phase until it returns to the normal phase. Thus, country s can choose only consumption
c and next-period capital stock k0 to maximize the default welfare given by
WD(a;k) = max





c + k0   (1   )k  (1   )ak   (k0;k); (4)
and
c;k0  0; (5)
where V (a0;k0;0;P) denotes the value of a country in the penalty phase with productivity shock a0, capital
stock k0 and zero debt.  denotes the capital adjustment costs, and  the penalty parameter capturing the
drop in TFP.
If it repays, the country enjoys the access to nancial markets today and remains in the normal phase
next period. The country can issue one period discount bonds b0 at price q(a;k0;b0), which is endogenous to
the country's default incentives. The bond price q(a;k0;b0) depends on TFP shock a, capital k0 and bond
5holding b0 because they aect default probabilities. Country s chooses consumption c, next period's capital
stock k0, and bond holding b0 to maximize the repayment welfare given by
WR(s) = max





c + k0   (1   )k + q(a;k0;b0)b0 + jb0j  ak + b   (k0;k); (7)
and the non-negativity constraints (5), where  is the real resource cost to access international nancial
markets. This parameter , therefore, captures the degree of capital controls in this economy. Innitely
large  produces a closed economy, i.e. nancial autarky; zero  produces an open economy with no capital
controls, i.e., full nancial liberalization.
Capital controls in reality can be classied into two categories. One is the price control which takes the
form of taxes on returns to international investment, taxes on certain types of transactions, or a mandatory
reserve requirement. For example, the U.S. imposed the interest equalization tax from 1963 to 1974; invest-
ment returns on foreign stocks and bonds were taxed at 1 percent to 15 percent depending on the maturity.
The other is the quantity control which takes the form of quotas or outright prohibitions. For example, the
Mexican government restricted commercial banks to hold no more than 10% of their loan portfolio as foreign
liabilities in 1992. We nd that both types of capital controls deliver similar quantitative implications on
international risk sharing. We present implications of the price control for most of the paper and show those
of the quantity control in Section 4. In addition, we observe capital controls on both inows and outows in
reality. Thus, we impose taxes on both international borrowing and lending.
For some countries with large amounts of debt relative to their income today, it is possible that given the
set of available contracts, they cannot satisfy their budget constraints (7) together with the non-negativity
constraints (5). In such cases, countries default on their debt.
Country in the Penalty Phase
A country in the penalty phase suers a drop in TFP each period, and so its production becomes (1 )ak.
It has no access to international nancial markets. Note that though countries in the penalty phase are not
allowed to save abroad, they still can save in domestic capital stocks. Empirically, defaulting countries often
regain access to markets after some period of exclusion. We thus assume that countries in the penalty phase
have some exogenous probability  of returning to the normal phase. Country (a;k;0) in the penalty phase
chooses consumption c and capital stock k0 to maximize the utility given by
V (a;k;0;P) = max
c;k0 u(c) + 
X
a0ja
(a0ja)[(1   )V (a0;k0;0;P) + V (a0;k0;0;N)] (8)
subject to the budget constraints (4) and the non-negativity constraints (5).
62.2 International Financial Intermediaries
International nancial intermediaries are assumed to be able to commit to loan contracts. They are com-
petitive, risk-neutral, and discount the future at the inverse of the risk-free interest rate R. They behave
passively and are willing to nance any non-defaulting countries in the normal phase as long as they are
compensated for the expected loss in case of default. Thus, the bond price schedule q(a;k0;b0) is such that
the intermediaries break even
q(a;k0;b0) = [1   p(a;k0;b0)]=R; (9)
where p(a;k0;b0) denotes the expected default probability of a country with TFP shock a, capital k0 and
bond holding b0.9 The default probability is the sum of the probabilities of the states under which this





2.3 Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
We rst dene the stationary recursive equilibrium, and then provide some characterization of the equilib-
rium. Let  be the probability measure on (X;@), where @ is the Borel -algebra on X. For any M 2 @,
(M) indicates the mass of countries whose states lie in M. Denote the transition matrix across states by
Q : X  @ ! [0;1], where Q(x;M) gives the probability of a country x switching to the set M next period.
Denition 1. A stationary recursive equilibrium consists of a world risk-free interest rate R, a bond
price schedule q(a;k0;b0), decision rules of countries fc(x);k0(x);b0(x);d(s)g, value functions of countries
fV (x);WD(a;k);WR(s)g and a distribution over countries , such that,
 Given q(a;k0;b0), the decision rules and the value functions solve each country's problem.
 Given R and the decision rules, the bond price schedule makes nancial intermediaries break even in
each contract.
 Bond markets clear:
R
fx:h=N;d(x)=0g q(s;b0(x))b0(x)d = 0.
 The distribution  is stationary: (M) =
R
X Q(x;M)d for any M 2 @.
Here we examine the stationary equilibrium under centralized borrowing. One can support the equilib-
rium allocation under decentralized borrowing with taxes on foreign borrowing and domestic capital returns
of each consumer, following Wright (2006). The analytical characterization of the equilibrium is limited un-
der the general equilibrium model with production. Still, the following provides two theoretical propositions
9The bond price can be alternatively modeled as a function of the country's current state s and bond holding b0. The
nancial intermediary computes the optimal capital stock k0 associated with bond holding b0 and then calculate the default
probability next period. We nd that the quantitative results are almost identical under both specications.
7characterizing the equilibrium. We will present detailed numerical characterization of the equilibrium in the
next section.
Proposition 1. If a country in the normal phase defaults on bond holding b2, it will default also on b1 for
any b1 < b2 xing (a;k).
Proposition 2. A country with a debt-output ratio smaller than  will never default.
Detailed proofs of the above two propositions are presented in Technical Appendix 1. Proposition 1
simply states that when a country defaults on some amount of debt, it will default for any larger amount of
debt. Defaulting welfare is independent of debt while the repayment welfare decreases with debt. Thus, for
countries with shock a and capital stock k, there exists a cuto level of debt, above which they will default.
Proposition 2 oers a sucient condition for safe debt. Given that output drops by a fraction of  after
default, a country with a debt-output ratio less than  will never default because the debt relief is less than
the output drop and the country also loses access to future borrowing after default. Note that this condition
is not necessary for safe debt. Countries with debt-output ratios larger than  may also choose to repay
with probability one, and thus the safe debt-output ratio is at least as large as .
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we assess the model's quantitative implication of nancial liberalization on international risk
sharing. First, we present evidence that nancial integration increases substantially and empirical evidence
that international risk sharing shows little improvement. We then calibrate the model economy to set up
the laboratory where we eliminate the tax on foreign asset holdings to endogenously generate nancial
integration. Finally, we present and investigate the model's implication that the observed degree of nancial
integration leads to little increase in international risk sharing.
3.1 Data
Financial integration undoubtedly increased over time. The literature commonly uses two direct measures of
nancial integration. One is a restriction measure which oers a qualitative index of ocial capital controls
on cross-border capital ows.10 The restriction measure indicates more nancial integration over time; a
large number of countries have removed capital controls and deregulated nancial markets (Prasad et al.,
2003). The other is an openness measure using actual cross-border capital ows across countries, in terms
of either gross (or net) foreign ows or gross (or net) foreign positions. These statistics present the same
picture: a dramatic increase in nancial integration.
10Most restriction measures are constructed based on the IMF publication Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). See Edison et al. (2004) for a thorough survey.
8To quantify the degree of nancial integration over time, we adopt the openness measure. More precisely,
we measure the degree of nancial integration at any period as the ratio of the world sum of absolute net
debt positions and the world GDP (later referred as the world asset-output ratio). The net debt position is
the dierence between the debt asset position and the debt liability position, constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). We use this measure of nancial integration because it is the closest empirical counterpart to
our model. Our sample consists of 21 OECD countries and 22 more-nancially-integrated countries (referred
also as emerging markets later) based on the classication in Prasad et al. (2003).11 The world asset-output
ratio more than doubles from 8% in 1970{1986 to 18% in 1987{2004.
Conventional wisdom suggests that countries should be able to share idiosyncratic risk better in a more-
nancially-integrated world, which motivates a large empirical literature examining the degree of interna-
tional risk sharing over recent decades. To measure the degree of risk sharing, the prevailing empirical liter-
ature uses a panel or cross-country regression of consumption growth rates on GDP growth rates. Cochrane
(1991) and Mace (1991) regress individual consumption growth on individual income growth to study the
extent of risk sharing across domestic agents. Lewis (1996) introduces this regression analysis to the inter-
national setting and rejects perfect risk sharing across countries.
We present panel regression analysis for the less-integrated period and the more-integrated period with
our sample countries. Specically, we examine the OLS regression of the form
lnci
t   ln ct = 0 + 1(lnyi
t   ln  yt) + ui
t; (11)
where ci
t denotes real nal consumption of country i at period t, yi
t real GDP,  ct and  yt average real nal
consumption and average real GDP over the sample countries, and ui
t the error term and xt = xt xt 1 for
any variable x.12 The regression focuses on the relation between country-specic consumption and output
by controlling for the world aggregate components with world average consumption and output. The degree
of international risk sharing is measured by the regression coecient 1; the lower the regression coecient,
the better countries share risk. Perfect risk sharing, generated by the standard complete markets model,
implies that consumption growth should not respond to individual income growth, i.e., 1 should be zero.
Our ndings are summarized in Table 1. First, the regression coecient 1 is signicantly dierent from
zero in both periods; it is 0.76 in the less-integrated period, and 0.84 in the more-integrated period, both
signicant at the 5% level. The null hypothesis of perfect international risk sharing is rejected in both
periods, consistent with the consensus in the literature that international risk sharing is far from perfect.
Though the panel regression assumes separabilities between consumption and leisure in the utility function,
the result holds more generally. We delegate the regression controlling leisure in Appendix 3, which shows
that allowing for nonseparabilities between leisure and consumption cannot explain the apparent lack of risk
11See Data Appendix 1 for details on the country sample.
12See Data Appendix 1 for details on the data sources.
9sharing across countries. This is consistent with the nding by Lewis (1996).
Table 1: Measurement of Risk Sharing: Regression Coecient 1
Sample Less-Integrated Period More-Integrated Period
1970{1986 1987{2004
43 countries :76 (.03) :84 (.02)
21 OECD :62 (.04) :60 (.03)
22 emerging :79 (.05) :88 (.02)
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Second, international risk sharing shows no statistically signicant improvement over the two periods; an
F-test rejects the hypothesis that the regression coecient 1 is smaller in the more-integrated period. The
result is robust to dierent sample groups of countries: emerging markets and OECD countries. Empirical
studies on emerging markets all document little improvement or even a decline in risk sharing over the period
of nancial integration. See Kose et al. (2009) for a comprehensive review. Thus, our result is consistent with
the existing studies. Empirical studies on OECD countries document mixed results. Some studies argue that
risk sharing improves after 1990 (e.g., Sorensen et al. (2007)), while other studies have found little evidence
of better risk sharing when looking at a longer period (e.g., Moser et al. (2004)). Figure 1 illustrates the
reason for the dierent conclusions by plotting the 9-year rolling window panel regression coecient for each
year, as in Kose et al. (2009). The regression coecient becomes smaller after the 1990s for the OECD
countries, which tends to lead to the conclusion that risk sharing increases. Nevertheless, the extent of risk
sharing, even in 2000, is similar to that in the 1970s. Thus, when comparing the two periods, we nd it hard
to argue that risk sharing improves substantially in the more-integrated period. This conclusion is robust
when we allow for nonseparable utility, as shown in Appendix 3.
Figure 1: Regression Coecient 1 ( 9-Year Rolling Panel)









10We also examine two alternative measures of international risk sharing for robustness checks. One is the
average ratio of consumption volatility and output volatility across countries, which is commonly used in
the international business cycle literature. The other is the cross-country regression of average consumption
growth on average output growth, which is proposed by Cochrane (1991). We nd that there is no sign
of better risk sharing in the more-nancially integrated period using either alternative measure. See Data
Appendix 3 for detailed results.
3.2 Calibration
In this subsection, we calibrate the model and set up the laboratory to explore the impact of nancial
liberalization on international risk sharing. To isolate the impact of nancial liberalization, we conduct two
model experiments with dierent taxes  while keeping the shock process and all the structural parameters
the same. Directly measuring the degree of capital controls  from the data is hard for two reasons. First,
typically governments impose more than one form of capital controls at each point of time, and capital
controls vary across time and across countries. Second, even if one could perfectly measure all the ocial
controls, it is dicult to gauge the eectiveness of these capital controls. We instead calibrate  in the rst
experiment to match the world debt-output ratio in the less-integrated period, and set  to be zero in the
second experiment to mimic nancial liberalization in the more-integrated period.
All countries have the same parameter values describing tastes and technology. The period utility function





where the risk aversion parameter  is chosen to be 2. The discount factor  is set such that the equilibrium
risk-free rate in the less-integrated period equals the average real return on US Treasury Bills, about 1
percent per year over the same period. The capital share  is set at 0.33 and the capital depreciation rate 










where  is set at 3 to match the average ratio of investment volatility and output volatility across countries.
We choose the probability of reentry to markets after default  to be 0.20, following Gelos et al. (2004).
They document that defaulting countries are denied access to markets for about 5 years on average. Table
2 summarizes the above parameter values.
We calibrate the world productivity process in two steps. We rst compute the TFP series for each
sample country, and then estimate a regime-switching process on the TFP series using maximum likelihood.
The basic approach is similar to Bai and Zhang (2005), but we need to incorporate the TFP drop parameter
 in the regime-switching process. According to our model, the computed TFP series of these countries over
11Table 2: Summary of Parameter Values
Preferences Risk aversion  = 2
Discount factor  = 0:89
Technology Capital share  = 0:33
Depreciation  = 0:10
Capital adjustment cost  = 3
Default penalty Re-entry probability  = 0:20
Taxes Less-integrated period 1 = 4%
More-integrated period 2 = 0
the exclusion period embody the drop in productivity. Thus, to infer the shock process we need to estimate
the world TFP process jointly with the TFP drop parameter.
The TFP series for country i at period t is computed using the standard growth accounting method:
logAi
t = logY i
t   logKi
t   (1   )logLi
t;
where Ai
t denotes the TFP level, Y i
t real GDP, Ki
t the capital stock and Li
t employment. The capital
stock is constructed perpetually using gross capital formation data. We detrend the TFP series using the
average world TFP growth rate of 1.3 percent. Let ai
t denote the logged and detrended TFP level. Note
that we take out only the common TFP trend from the world TFP series, unlike the international business
cycle literature, where each country is detrended individually. Thus, our way of detrending leaves in more
heterogeneity across countries and allows for a greater incentive to share risk.
The calibrated TFP series have two key features. First, dierent subgroups of countries have dierent
characteristics. In particular, the coecient of variation of the TFPs series is 2% for the OECD countries
and 5% for the emerging markets. Second, some countries display dierent characteristics across dierent
periods of time. For example, the mean level and the coecient of variation of Peruvian TFP series are,
respectively, 3.49 and 0.01 before 1980, but, respectively, 3.02 and 0.07 after 1980. These features of the
data motivate us to adopt a regime-switching process to estimate the world TFP process.
We assume that there are two regimes, < 2 f1;2g. Each regime < has its own mean <, persistence <
and innovation standard deviation <. The TFP shock ai
t of country i in regime <i
t at period t follows a











t is independently and identically distributed and drawn from a standard normal distribution N(0;1),
and hi
t is a dummy variable (1 if a country is in the state of default and 0 otherwise). In our data sample,
there are 102 observations in the state of default, which helps us identify . Details of these observations
12are reported in Table 8 of the Data Appendix. At any period, country i has some probability of switching
to the other regime, governed by the transition matrix P.
Given the calibrated TFP panel series fai
tg and the dummy panel series fhi
tg, we use maximum likelihood
to estimate the unknown parameters:  = f(<;<;<);P;g. We use an extension of the technique in
Hamilton (1989) from one time series to panel series. Technical Appendix 2 describes the algorithm in detail.
The estimates of the parameter values are reported in Table 3. We label the two regimes according to their
volatilities as the low-volatility and the high-volatility regime. The high-volatility regime can be interpreted
as emerging countries, and the low-volatility regime as OECD countries. The TFP drop parameter is
estimated to be 2%.
Table 3: Estimated Productivity Process
Regime Innovation  Persistence  Mean  Switching Prob. P
High Low
High-volatility .05 (.001) .99 (.004) 3.17 (.05) .88 (.07) .12 (.02)
Low-volatility .02 (.013) .99 (.021) 4.39 (.10) .05 (.27) .95 (.19)
TFP drop parameter  .02 (.005)
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
3.3 Simulation Results
After calibrating the model, we rst use a non-linear recursive technique to compute the model equilibrium
twice: one for  at 4 percent and one for  at 0 percent. For the detailed computational algorithm see
Technical Appendix 3. We then simulate the model for the two experiments and examine implications on
international risk sharing. For each experiment, we simulate the model 1,000 times with 17 periods and
43 countries in each simulation, to be consistent with the data. Each simulation starts from the invariant
stationary distribution of the corresponding experiment. The main ndings are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Simulation Results
Data Model
1970{1986 1986{2004 1 = 4% 2 = 0%
World asset-output ratio 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.18
Regression coecient 1 0.76 0.84 0.64 0.63
(.03) (.02) (.04) (.03)
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
When the tax  drops from 4% to 0%, the model generates an increase in the world asset-output ratio
from 8% to 18%. This increase is similar to what we observed in the data from the less-integrated to more-
integrated period. There is little improvement, however, in international risk sharing; the panel regression
coecients are 0.64 and 0.63 in these two experiments, respectively, and not statistically dierent from each
other. Perfect risk sharing is clearly rejected in each experiment as in the data. Note that the degree of
13risk sharing in our model is higher than that observed in the data because our model abstracts from all
other types of frictions and only looks at nancial frictions. We nd, however, that nancial frictions are
important in accounting for the deviation from perfect risk sharing. This is consistent with the empirical
nding in Lewis (1996).
The key to understanding the results is default risk, which is present even with removal of capital
controls. Default risk constrains the increase in capital ows too much to improve international risk sharing.
To demonstrate this mechanism, we rst focus on the experiment with zero tax to illustrate how default
risk aects risk sharing. Default risk endogenously constrains capital ows across countries, and borrowing
is more dicult at bad times. It also gives rise to explicit sovereign defaults. We then look across the two
experiments to understand why there is no improvement in international risk sharing. We nd that with
sovereign default risk the degree of nancial integration, generated by removal of the tax, is too small to
improve risk sharing. Moreover, more borrowing under a lower tax leads to more equilibrium default, which
hurts international risk sharing.
3.4 Default Risk and Imperfect Risk Sharing
To see the role of sovereign default risk, we contrast our benchmark model with default risk (labeled the
default model) with a model without default risk, basically the incomplete markets model with the natural
borrowing constraints (labeled as the no-default model). The natural borrowing constraints guarantee the
existence of equilibrium by ruling out the Ponzi scheme, and are set such that countries at the maximum
borrowing limits are able to repay their debt without incurring negative consumption. The implicit assump-
tion behind the natural borrowing constraints is that countries will always repay their debt, which is within
their ability to repay. To make two models comparable, we set all the parameters to be the same and  at
zero. Table 5 compares the implications of the default model and the no-default model. Risk sharing in
the no-default model is not perfect with the regression coecient of 0.45. The no-default model, however,
provides much better risk sharing than the default model: 0.45 versus 0.63.
Table 5: Default vs. No-Default Model
Default Model No-Default Model
Regression coecient 1
Full Sample 0.63 (.03) 0.45 (.03)
Defaulting countries 0.65 (.03) {
Non-defaulting countries 0.57 (.02) {
Maximum safe debt-output ratio 0.06 6.80
Maximum debt-output ratio 0.14 6.80
World asset-output ratio 0.18 1.21
Fraction of countries in the penalty phase 0.15 0.00
Note: numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
Sovereign default risk aects international risk sharing through three channels: constrained borrowing,
14counter-cyclical borrowing terms and equilibrium default. Default risk endogenously constrains borrowing.
For each country, there exists a cuto debt level, below which it will repay for sure next period (referred to
as the safe debt limit). The country has to pay a premium for any debt above the safe debt limit. There also
exists a cuto debt level, above which it will default for sure next period (referred to as the risky debt limit).
The risky debt limit is the debt capacity of the country. In Figure 2, the left panel plots the safe debt limit
and the risky debt limit for countries with the median shock and zero debt, and the right panel illustrates
these limits in terms of ratio to output. Richer countries (higher capital stocks) have larger borrowing
capacities both in terms of safe debt and risky debt, but these borrowing capacities increase slower than
output when capital stocks increase. The averages of the maximum safe and risky debt-output ratio are 6%
and 14% across countries in the default model, much smaller than those in the no-default model, 680%.13
This helps explain why the equilibrium world asset-output ratio in the no-default model is 6 times larger
than that in the default model: 1.2 versus 0.18.
Figure 2: Endogenous Debt Constraints




















Borrowing is more dicult in bad times due to higher default risk. This is a common feature of the default
model with incomplete markets. Because repayment is non-contingent and non-negotiable, it is more painful
at bad times than at good times. Countries thus have higher incentives to default at bad times. Under the
persistent shock process, risk-neutral international nancial intermediaries endogenize this pattern of default
by charging a higher interest rate premium during bad times. Figure 3 plots the bond price schedule, i.e., the
inverse of the interest rates. The bond price decreases in loans with everything else xed; it is 1=R for safe
debt, lower than 1=R for risky debt, and zero for loans above the risky debt limit. Moreover, the bond price
is low when output is low; it is low for low shocks (as illustrated in the left panel) and for small capital stocks
(as illustrated in the right panel). In particular, risky debt is oered at a much lower price under bad shocks
13The maximum safe debt-output ratio and the maximum debt-output ratio in the no-default model are the average ratio of
the natural borrowing limit and output.
15than under good shocks, as is shown in the left panel for the debt range between 0.03 and 0.09. This larger
price discount at bad times makes the country even more constrained because an additional unit of risky
debt provides much fewer resources from the lenders. Thus, sovereign default risk generates time-varying
impediments to international risk sharing; borrowing is the most costly when countries need it the most in
bad times to smooth consumption.
Figure 3: Bond Price Schedule

























The left panel plots the bond prices of countries with median capital and zero debt under
dierent shock realizations. The right panel plots the bond prices of countries with the
median shock and zero debt under dierent capital stocks.
Default risk gives rise to equilibrium default, which hurts risk sharing. Equilibrium default provides some
state contingency in debt repayment; default usually occurs in bad times and so stopping servicing debt helps
mitigate drops in current consumption. Equilibrium default, however, hinders risk sharing in that defaulting
countries are excluded from nancial markets for a long random period. Since shocks are serially correlated,
countries are likely to remain in bad times in this exclusion period and want to borrow, but they cannot.
When we compare countries with a default history with those without a default history in our simulation,
the rst group has lower risk sharing than the second group; the regression coecient 1 is 0.65 for the rst
group and 0.57 for the second group.14 Thus, actual default in fact hurts overall risk sharing. The default
model generates 15% of countries in the state of default (see Table 5), which also contributes to the low
degree of risk sharing.
Given the importance of default risk and equilibrium default on international risk sharing, we illustrate
the patterns of risky borrowing and equilibrium default in the model economy. When a country receives a
better shock, especially when it switches from the high-volatilty regime to the low-volatility regime, it has
large incentive to borrow to build up capital stock and to increase consumption given the highly persistent
shock process. The country might borrow risky loans given favorable bond prices at good times. This leads
to a borrowing boom. If the good shock is around for a long enough period, the country will gradually pay
14The F-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the regression coecient for defaulters is larger than that for non-defaulters
at the 5 percent signicance level.
16o its debt and start to lend to the rest of the world. Before the country pays o its debt, however, each
period there is some probability that the country is hit by a bad shock or switches back to the high-volatility
regime. With large outstanding debt and a low current output, the country might end up in default. Thus,
the model predicts that countries default in bad times at the high-volatility regime with large debt. Later
we will test these model implications with empirical observations on sovereign default.
3.5 Impact of Financial Integration
The above discussion illustrates how sovereign default risk prevents countries from risk sharing through
endogenous constraints on borrowing, which is more dicult in bad times, and costly equilibrium default.
These mechanisms are the inherent features of a world with default risk and incomplete markets, independent
of capital controls. Now we compare the two experiments to show why international risk sharing improves
little when nancial integration increases. Table 6 reports comparison of key statistics.
Table 6: Model Implications across the Two Experiments
Less-Integrated Period More-Integrated Period
 = 4%  = 0
World asset-output ratio 0.08 0.18
Maximum safe debt-output ratio 0.05 0.06
Maximum debt-output ratio 0.10 0.14
Interest rate premium 0.02 0.03
Newly defaulted rate 0.02 0.03
Fraction of countries in the penalty phase 0.10 0.15
Regression coecient 1 0.64 (0.04) 0.63 (0.03)
Consumption equivalence ~ c 0.325 0.329
Notes: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
The removal of capital controls boosts international borrowing and lending. The direct eect is that it
eliminates the tax on foreign capital ows and makes international nancial markets more attractive. The
indirect eect is that it loosens the borrowing constraints because countries are more willing to repay their
debt with more attractive nancial markets. When  decreases from 4% to 0%, the average maximum safe
debt-output ratio increases from 5% to 6% and the average maximum debt-output ratio increases from 10%
to 14%. Foreign savings levels increase more than foreign debt levels in response to the removal of capital
controls, as is shown in Figure 4. Though the maximum amounts of both borrowing and savings increase,
the maximum savings increases from 0.15 to 0.65, but the maximum borrowing only moves from 0.1 to 0.14.
This is the result of the endogenous borrowing constraint still present from default risk. In sum, nancial
integration increases, and the world asset-output ratio also rises from 8% to 18% as in the data.
Despite this increase in the world asset-output ratio, there is no signicant improvement in international
risk sharing. The key behind this result is again sovereign default risk. Default risk constrains the increase
of capital ows across countries. To demonstrate this, we conduct an experiment with the same reduction
17Figure 4: Distribution over Foreign Assets
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of the tax in the no-default model. The world asset-output ratio increases by about six times from 18% to
121% in the no-default model. As a result, international risk sharing improves signicantly; the regression
coecient 1 decreases from 0.56 to 0.45.15 In contrast, the default model only leads to the doubling of the
world asset-output ratio. This seemingly large increase in capital ows is too small to increase international
risk sharing signicantly.
Moreover, countries also do more risky borrowing under a lower tax, which leads to more frequent
sovereign defaults. In particular, countries with debt levels in region B and C of Figure 4 have a 5%
probability of default. A higher density of countries in region B and C, induced by the removal of capital
controls, leads to more frequent default episodes. Consequently, we observe a higher average risk premium
and a higher default rate in the more-integrated period, reported in Table 6. The average risk premium is 1%
higher, and the newly defaulted rate is 1% higher in the more-integrated period.16 Furthermore, the fraction
of countries in the penalty phase is also higher in the more-integrated period than that in the less-integrated
period: 15% versus 10%. Our previous discussion shows that both the higher risk premia and the actual
defaults hurt the degree of risk sharing.
We also look at welfare in the default model across the two periods. Following the standard approach,
15The standard errors of both coecients are 0.02.
16The newly defaulted rate is the fraction of countries in the normal phase that decide to default.







Permanent consumption is the constant consumption level that gives the same level of welfare as that of an
average country in the model. We nd that the removal of capital controls produces a welfare gain of a 1.2%
increase in permanent consumption. This increase incorporates benets from elimination of the tax, from a
more ecient capital allocation and from better risk sharing.
To evaluate the impact of nancial frictions on the welfare gain, we compute permanent consumption
for the no-default model and for the complete markets model under  = 0 using the same parameters as
in the default model. We nd that the welfare is 42% higher in the no-default model and 68% higher in
the complete markets model than that in the default model under  = 0:04.17 Thus, the welfare gain from
the removal of capital controls is small when international nancial markets are characterized by limited
enforcement on debt contracts. The small welfare gain is consistent with our nding of little improvement
in international risk sharing in response to the removal of capital controls.
In summary, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that nancial integration does not necessarily
lead to increased risk sharing using our quantitative model. This helps reconcile why the extensive empirical
studies nd little evidence of better risk sharing in the more-integrated period. The numerical analysis
also shows that the observed degree of nancial integration seems large, but it is far smaller than the
degree needed to increase risk sharing signicantly. Thus, the commonly proposed policy|the removal of
capital controls|cannot automatically deliver increased international risk sharing, if nancial contracts are
incomplete and imperfectly enforced.
4 Further Analysis
In the previous section, we demonstrated the impacts of sovereign default risk on nancial integration and
international risk sharing. In this section we conduct further tests and analysis of the model mechanism.
First, we show that the model implications on sovereign default are consistent with empirical observations.
Second, we illustrate that the model implications on dierential degrees of risk sharing across subgroups
are consistent with the data. Third, we experiment with an alternative modeling of capital controls, the
quantity mechanism, and nd that our conclusion is robust.
17We nd a much larger welfare gain under complete markets than that in van Wincoop (1999). The reason is that we study
production economies and calibrate our model to a sample of both developed and developing countries, while van Wincoop
(1999) studies endowment economies and calibrates his model to only OECD countries. The scope for welfare gains from
nancial integration is thus larger in our study.
19Model Implications on Sovereign Default
Our model has three main implications on sovereign default. First, all default episodes in the model happen
in the high-volatility regime, and none in the low-volatility regime. The high-volatilty regime has lower
and more volatile TFP realizations than the low-volatility regime. This is broadly consistent with the
empirical ndings. After 1970, all default episodes happen in emerging markets, and none in OECD countries.
Furthermore, emerging markets have much more volatile TFP processes than OECD countries.
Second, the model predicts that defaulting countries have larger debt than non-defaulting countries: 56%
versus 13% of their output. This is consistent with the nding in Reinhart et al. (2003). They document
that for a sample of 27 middle-income countries, defaulting countries on average borrow more in terms of
output than non-defaulting countries: around 41% versus 34%.
Third, the model produces a higher fraction of countries in the penalty phase in the more-integrated
period. Empirically, we construct the fraction of countries in the penalty phase using the sovereign default
episodes collected by Standard & Poor's. We classify a country as \in the penalty phase" if it has not
resumed its normal debt services and regained access to markets after the event of default. Among our 43
countries, the fraction of countries in the penalty phase almost doubles over the two periods: 5% in the
less-integrated period and 9% in the more-integrated period.18 When looking at a larger sample of 202
countries, for which Beers and Chambers (2004) provide the detailed information on sovereign default, we
nd a similar pattern: the fraction of countries in the penalty phase is 10% in the less-integrated period and
26% in the more-integrated period.
Risk Sharing Across Subgroups
Our model predicts that countries in the low-volatility regime have better risk sharing than those in the high-
volatility regime. Countries in the low-volatility regime never default because their TFP is of high levels
and low volatility. Thus, they face looser borrowing constraints and lower interest rate schedules than those
in the high-volatility regime, and so enjoy better risk sharing. In addition, these countries also accumulate
a large amount of precautionary savings to insure against the likelihood of switching to the high-volatility
regime, which also provides self-insurance. To demonstrate this prediction, we simulate a large number of
countries from the invariant distribution and divide countries into two groups according to their regimes for
each experiment. We then look at the degree of risk sharing for each subgroup, and report the results in
Table 7 under the model panel. The regression coecient for countries in the low-volatility regime is around
0.64 and statistically lower than that for countries in the high-volatility regime, 0.85.
We investigate this prediction empirically by dividing our sample into two groups: OECD countries and
emerging markets. Loosely speaking, the low-volatility regime can be interpreted as the OECD countries
18See Data Appendix 2 for detailed documentation.
20Table 7: Risk Sharing 1 Across Sub-groups
Data Model
1970-1986 1987-2004  = 0:04  = 0
Low-volatility regime (OECD) 0.62 (.04) 0.60 (.03) 0.64 (.01) 0.63 (.02)
High-volatility regime (emerging) 0.79 (.05) 0.88 (.02) 0.85 (.02) 0.85 (.03)
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
and the high-volatility regime as the emerging markets. We measure the degree of risk sharing for each
subgroup and report the empirical results in Table 7 under the data panel. The OECD countries have better
risk sharing than emerging markets in each sub-period, which is consistent with our model's implication.
When examining the model implications before and after nancial liberalization, we nd that both groups
show little improvement in risk sharing. This nding is not surprising for countries in the high-volatility
regime because they are on average borrowers and greatly constrained in borrowing due to default risk
both before and after liberalization. It is surprising, however, for countries in the low-volatility regime
because they are on average savers and nancial liberalization remove all constraints on savings. The key
to understanding this nding is the general equilibrium eect. After nancial liberalization, the increase in
borrowing is limited due to the presence of default risk. Thus, in equilibrium the increase in savings is also
limited; this occurs through a lower risk free interest rate which lowers saving incentives of countries in the
low-volatility regime. This nding is consistent with the data: both the OECD and emerging countries show
no signicant improvement in risk sharing after nancial liberalization.
Alternative Form of Capital Controls
We conduct a robustness check of our result on an alternative form of capital controls: the quantity control.
Instead of imposing taxes on international borrowing and lending, we impose a quantity restriction on
international borrowing and lending, given by
  BM  b0  BM; (14)
where BM > 0 is the maximum amount of international transactions. We rst calibrate BM to match the
observed asset-output ratio in the less-integrated period. We next remove the quantity restriction in the
second experiment to mimic nancial liberalization in the more-integrated period. We nd that the degree
of international risk sharing is almost the same across the two experiments: 1 is 0.66 with a standard
error 0.04 in the less-integrated period and 0.63 with a standard error of 0.03 in the more-integrated period.
Thus, our conclusion that international risk sharing shows little improvement despite nancial liberalization
is robust to dierent modeling choices of the capital controls.
215 Conclusion
Over the last two decades, the world witnessed a widespread reduction in capital controls. As a result,
countries became more nancially integrated over time. Conventional wisdom predicts that countries can
better insure macroeconomic risk when they are more nancially integrated. The large empirical literature on
this subject, however, nds little evidence of increased international risk sharing over time despite widespread
nancial deregulation.
This work shows that the liberalization of nancial markets does not necessarily lead to a signicant
increase in international risk sharing if contracts are incomplete and enforceability of debt repayment is
limited. Default risk on sovereign debt acts as an impediment to capital ows and constrains the degree
of nancial integration. Thus, the observed increase in nancial integration, while seemingly large, is too
limited to signicantly improve risk sharing.
We demonstrate this idea using a calibrated DSGE model with a continuum of countries and their default
choices on sovereign debt. We quantify the degree of capital controls by matching the observed capital ows in
the less-integrated period in the rst experiment, and eliminating capital controls in the second experiment.
We nd that when countries remove capital controls, capital ows increase, but the increase is quantitatively
too small to signicantly improve risk sharing. In addition, nancial integration leads to more sovereign
defaults, which hurts risk sharing.
Limited enforceability on debt contracts profoundly impacts international capital ows and international
risk sharing. Sovereign default risk endogenously constrains borrowing, makes borrowing more dicult in
bad times, and generates costly equilibrium default. Thus, default risk is a time-varying impediment to
international risk sharing. The commonly proposed policy|the removal of capital controls and deregulation
of nancial markets|cannot automatically deliver signicant improvements in international risk sharing so
long as nancial contracts are incomplete and imperfectly enforced.
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25Data Appendix
In this appendix, we rst describe the data sources and the country coverage in detail, then show the
empirical facts on sovereign defaults, and nally present dierent measures of international risk sharing.
1. Data Description
Country Sample
Given our interest in how nancial integration aects risk sharing, we focus on countries with relatively open
nancial markets. Following Prasad et al. (2003), we include 21 OECD countries and 22 more-nancially-
integrated countries in our sample. The 21 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 22 more-nancially-
integrated countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
Data Sources
The national accounts data (real GDP, real nal consumption and real gross capital formation) are primarily
from the World Bank's publication World Development Indicators 2004 (WDI); for missing years in WDI, we
use the Penn World Table 6.2. For the 21 OECD countries, employment data are from the OECD databases.
For the following 13 countries, employment data are from national statistics: Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India,
Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. For the
remaining 9 countries, employment data are supplemented by the Penn World Table. The data used to
measure nancial integration are from the data set constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). All
variables except employment are in terms of the U.S. dollar.
2. Sovereign Defaults over 1970{2004
In this appendix, we construct the overall statistics of the fraction of countries in default over the less-
integrated and the more-integrated period. We collect the episodes of sovereign defaults on foreign-currency
bank or bond debt. According to Standard & Poor's, sovereign default is dened as \the failure to meet a
principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the specied grace period) contained in the original
terms of the debt issue". Beers and Chambers (2004) report sovereign default episodes for 202 sovereign
countries from 1975 to 2002 using data from Standard & Poor's. We expand the year coverage of their data
set to 1970{2004 for our 43 sample countries. In particular, only Argentina defaulted in 2003, and there are
no countries defaulting during 1970{74 and 2004.
26The default episodes are summarized in Table 8. A country is classied as \in default" until its normal
debt services resume after negotiation and it regains the access to markets. For example, Argentina defaulted
in 1982 and is in default until 1993 according to Standard & Poor's. Using this table, we can construct the
fraction of countries in default for each period. The average number of countries in default is 2.35 (about
5% of the 43 countries) in the less-integrated period and is 5.35 (about 9% of the 43 countries) in the
more-integrated period. The fraction of countries in default almost doubles over the two periods.
Table 8: Default Episodes in the Data









Peru 1976, 78, 80, 84{97
Philippines 1983{92
South Africa 1985{87, 89, 93
Turkey 1978{79, 82
Venezuela 1983{88, 90, 95{97
3. Alternative Measurement of Risk Sharing
This appendix considers a robustness check over the risk sharing regression by allowing for a nonseparable
utility function between leisure and consumption. We show that adding leisure cannot explain lack of
international risk sharing. In addition, this appendix presents two alternative ways of measuring international
risk sharing in the literature. One uses cross-section regression analysis. The other uses consumption
volatility relative to output volatility. All experiements indicate no substantial increase in international risk
sharing in the more-integrated period relative to the less-integrated period.
Non-Separable Utility Function
One attempt to explain lack of international risk sharing in the literature is assuming that leisure in the
utility function is not separable from consumption. Here we follow Lewis (1996) and run a regression to
control leisure in a nonseparable utility function,
lnci





t denotes employment of country i at period t and (t) is a time-dummy variable. Table 9 reports the
regression coecients 0 and 1 for dierent country groups and dierent time periods. For our sample of 43
countries, the regression coecients on labor growth 0 are not signicantly dierent from zero in both the
27less-integrated period and the more-integrated period, while the regression coecients on output growth 1
remain large and signicantly dierent from zero. This implies that assuming non-separability in leisure and
consumption cannot explain apparent lack of risk sharing across countries, as documented by Lewis (1996).
More importantly, there is still no signicant improvement in risk sharing after nancial liberalization, with
1 of 0.81 in the less-integrated period and 0.82 in the more-integrated period. The results hold similarly
for the 22 emerging markets. For the 21 OECD countries, consumption growth responds to labor growth,
but adding labor still cannot explain imperfect risk sharing across OECD countries. When controlling for
non-separability in leisure and consumption, we observe a decrease in the regression coecient 1 and thus
an increase in international risk sharing. The improvement, however, is still modest relative to the prediction
of the no-default model.
Table 9: Measurement of Risk Sharing with Labor
Country Group Less-Integrated Period More-Integrated Period
1970{1986 1987{2004
0 1 0 1
43 countries  0:01 (.02) 0:81 (.03) 0:006 (.02) 0:82 (.02)
21 OECD countries 0:07 (.05) 0:72 (.03) 0:110 (.03) 0:60 (.03)
22 emerging countries  0:03 (.06) 0:84 (.05) 0:005 (.03) 0:86 (.02)
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Cross-Section Regression
One alternative way to estimate the degree of risk sharing is to use the cross-section regression, proposed
by Cochrane (1991). We run the 3-year rolling cross-country regression of the average consumption growth
rate on the average GDP growth rate:
lnci = 0 + 1lnyi + ui: (16)
Table 10 reports the average cross-section regression coecients 1 for each sub-period and for each country
group. Again, international risk sharing is far from perfect for each period and each country group. More
importantly, there is no signicant increase in international risk sharing for both OECD countries and
emerging countries over the two periods.
Table 10: Median Regression Coecient on Output Growth 1
Country Group Less-Integrated Period More-Integrated Period
1970{1986 1987{2004
43 countries :70 (.10) :91 (.07)
21 OECD :75 (.15) :79 (.17)
22 Emerging :68 (.13) :90 (.10)
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
28Consumption Volatility
Besides the regression-based measurements of international risk sharing, another commonly used measure-
ment is the ratio of consumption volatility and GDP volatility, as in Backus et al. (1992). With more
nancial integration, countries should have lower consumption volatility relative to output since countries
can insure better their idiosyncratic shocks. Table 11 reports the average ratio of consumption volatility and
GDP volatility across dierent groups of countries over the two periods. There is no statistically signicant
decrease in the relative consumption volatility over the two periods.
Table 11: Mean Ratio of Consumption Volatility and Output Volatility
Country Group Less-Integrated Period More-Integrated Period
1970{1986 1987{2004
43 countries 1:08 (.29) 0:92 (.17)
21 OECD 1:07 (.23) 0:88 (.16)
22 Emerging 1:10 (.35) 0:95 (.17)
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Technical Appendix
1. Characterization of Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1: Since country (a;k;b2;N) chooses to default, we have
V (a;k;b2;N) = WD(a;k) > WR(a;k;b2):
Since the repaying welfare WR is increasing in b, we have
WR(a;k;b2) > WR(a;k;b1) for any b1 < b2:
This implies WD(a;k) > WR(a;k;b1) for any b1 < b2. Thus, country (a;k;b1;N) will also choose to default.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: For any country (a;k;b;N) with b >  ak, the budget set under repayment is larger




d;0) denote the optimal choices of the recursive problems WR and WD respectively.
Thus, we have









29Furthermore, we know that the repaying welfare is higher than the defaulting welfare when b  0, and in
particular, V (a;k;0;N)  V (a;k;0;P). Therefore, we have




Hence, any country with b >  ak will not default. Q.E.D.
2. Estimation of the World Productivity Process
This appendix describes the EM algorithm, used to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of parameters










where 	i = fai
T;ai
T 1;:::;ai
1g denotes country i's TFP series,  = ff<;<;<g<=1;2;;Pg the set of the
parameters to be estimated, N the number of countries, T the total number of periods, < the regime and f
















Due to the nonlinearity of the maximum likelihood function, we cannot solve the parameters analytically.
Instead, we use the EM algorithm to solve the maximum likelihood estimates iteratively. We start with an
initial guess of the parameters n 1. We then update the conditional probabilities of regimes in each period
for each country using Bayes' rule. Given the conditional probabilities, we next compute n with maximum
likelihood. We iterate these procedures until fng converges.























To compute the model, we start with a guess of the world interest rate R and a guess of the bond price
schedule q(a;k0;b0) as the reciprocal of R. We then solve each country's value functions and decision rules
using value function iterations. Given the optimal default decision under the normal phase, we update
the bond price schedule as qn+1(a;k0;b0) = (1   pn(a;k0;b0))=R, where pn(a;k0;b0) is the default probability
30constructed from the optimal default choices dn(a0;k0;b0). We iterate the above procedures until q converges,
i.e., jqn+1(a;k0;b0) qn(a;k0;b0)j < . After the bond price schedule converges, we next compute the invariant
distribution  as a solution to  = Q, where Q denotes the transition matrix over states governed by
the optimal decision rules. Finally, we calculate the excess demand of bonds over the invariant distribution
and check if the bond markets clear. If not, we update the interest rate and repeat the above procedure.
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